







Carlos Pestana Barros & Nicolas Peypoch  
 
 
A Comparative Analysis of Productivity Change in Italian and 











António Afonso & João Tovar Jalles 
 




Department of Economics 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
ISSN Nº 0874-4548 
School of Economics and Management 
TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF LISBON 
 1 




António Afonso $ # and João Tovar Jalles# 
 
 
Abstract: We estimate fiscal responses for an OECD panel, accounting for cross-country 
interactions, and also estimate the fiscal responses in a panel VAR. We find that governments 
have increased primary balances when facing higher government indebtedness, implying a 
Ricardian fiscal regime, while primary balances have improved to reduce government debt. 
These results hold for the single regression panel analysis and for the panel VAR. 
 
JEL: C23, E62, H62 




In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis and in the context of 
important restrictions to the implementation of fiscal policies, notably in the European Union 
(EU), with the need for fiscal consolidation ever so present, the appraisal of how fiscal 
authorities adjust their reactions is quite important. For instance, it is useful to assess whether 
the track record as been on of more active (less Ricardian) or more passive fiscal 
developments in OECD economies, which can hint at the future expected reaction from the 
fiscal authorities. 
The existing literature has estimated fiscal policy response functions notably in a cross-
country analysis setup. In this context, where the underlying economic rationale is that 
governments care about fiscal sustainability issues, it is possible to envisage a simple fiscal 
reaction function with the primary balance improving to counteract past increases in 
government debt.  
Several studies have addressed this question via single country analysis (Bohn, 2008) and 
panel analysis, although a VAR approach has also been used (see Canzoneri et al., 2001). For 
instance, Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2005) mention that primary balances increase as 
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response to higher government indebtedness in the EU. Afonso (2008), for an EU panel, 
reports evidence of a passive fiscal regime, and a counter-cyclical response of fiscal policy, 
with the primary balance improving with increases in the output gap.1 On the other hand, the 
existence of possible cross-section dependences, notably given the economic and financial 
linkages in OECD countries, capital markets integration and spillover effects, common 
monetary policy for the Euro area countries, has been scarcely addressed in this framework. 
Therefore, in our paper we estimate fiscal responses for the period 1970-2010, for OECD 
countries. Our contributions include: i) considering the cross-country interactions that occur 
inside the country panel, due to possible common factors; ii) estimating primary balances and 
a debt responses together in a panel VAR to provide additional robustness to the results. 
In a nutshell, we find that governments have, on average, increased primary balances as a 
response to higher previous government indebtedness, implying that a Ricardian fiscal regime 
cannot be discarded. Moreover, results also show that better primary balances have been used 
to reduce the level of outstanding government debt in the subsequent periods. These results 
hold both for the single regression panel analysis and for the panel VAR. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology. Section 3 
reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Fiscal Reaction Functions 
A common approach (see Canzoneri et al., 2001, and Afonso, 2008), for the empirical 
validation of the existence of Ricardian Fiscal regimes aims at assessing: i) if fiscal authorities 
are motivated by stabilization and sustainability motives, which then a implies positive 
response of the budget balance to the stock of debt; ii) and whether the primary budget 
balance negatively influences government liabilities. Therefore, we can estimate the following 
fiscal relationships, notably in the context of our panel dataset: 
 1 1it it it it its s B z v            , (1)  
 1 1it it it it itB s B z u            . (2)  
In equation (1) the primary balance (s) is a function of government debt (B) and allows us 
to test whether 0 , signalling a non-Ricardian fiscal regime or whether 0 , translating a 
Ricardian fiscal regime. This is essentially a fiscal reaction function along the lines of Bohn 
_____________________________ 
1 Golinelli and Momigliano (2008) review alternative specifications of fiscal policy reaction functions on the 
basis of different measures for the primary balance. 
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(2008). On the other hand, equation (2) is compatible with the standard budget deficit and 
debt dynamics formulation (see Afonso, 2008 for details). The hypothesis of a Ricardian 
fiscal regime is not rejected when 0 , as most likely the government is then using budget 
surpluses to reduce outstanding government debt. On the other hand, with 0 there may be 
a case for a non-Ricardian regime, i.e., a regime of fiscal dominance. In addition, the output 
gap (z), is also added to control for the reaction of fiscal variables to the business cycle. 
Such first-differenced equation should take care of stationarity issues, however it 
introduces a correlation between the differenced lagged dependent variable and the 
differenced error term, hence, the use of instruments is required. Consistent estimates can be 
obtained with two-stage least squares (TSLS) with instrumental variables correlated with 
1 its ( 1 itB ) and orthogonal to itv ( itu ). Indeed, lagged values 2 its and 2itB satisfy these 
assumptions and can be used as IV for the first-differenced equations (1) and (2). For 
completeness we also computed the pooled OLS version, and we also provide some 
robustness by presenting both the pooled and panel versions of an IV-GLS estimator as well 
as Arellano-Bover’s (1995) System-GMM estimator.2  
 
2.2. Econometric Issues: Robustness 
One concern when working with time-series data is the possibility of spurious correlation 
between the variables of interest (Granger and Newbold, 1974). This situation arises when 
series are not stationary, that is, they contain stochastic trends as it is largely the case with 
GDP series. The advantage of panel data integration is threefold: firstly, enables to by-pass 
the difficulty related to short spanned time series; secondly, the tests are more powerful than 
the conventional ones; thirdly, cross-section information reduces the probability of a spurious 
regression (Barnerjee, 1999).3  
Therefore, the time-series properties of the data play an important role, suggesting that the 
bias in our models is the result of nonstationary errors, which are introduced into the fixed-
effects and GMM equations by the imposition of parameter homogeneity. Hence, careful 
modelling of short-run dynamics requires a slightly different econometric approach. We 
assume that (1), or (2), represent the equilibrium which holds in the long-run, but that the 
dependent variable may deviate from its path in the short-run (due, e.g., to fiscal or 
macroeconomic shocks that may be persistent). There are often good reasons to expect the 
_____________________________ 
2 Which jointly estimates the equations in first differences, using as instruments lagged levels of the dependent 
and independent variables, and in levels, using as instruments the first differences of the regressors. 
3 Recall, additionally, that t-ratios are invalid for the estimations if error terms are nonstationary. 
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long-run equilibrium relationships between variables to be similar across groups of countries, 
via e.g. budget constraints or common technologies (unobserved TFP), capital markets 
integration and spillover effects, or common monetary policy for the countries within the 
Euro area influencing them in a similar way. In fact, in line with discussions in the empirical 
growth literature for modelling the “measure of our ignorance” we shall assume that the long-
run relationship is composed of a country-specific level and a set of common factors with 
country-specific factor loadings.  
The parameters of (1) and (2) can be obtained via recent panel data methods. Indeed, 
based on the mean of the estimates (but not taking into account that certain parameters may be 
the same across groups), we can use the Mean Group (MG)4 estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 
1995). This estimator is appropriate for the analysis of dynamic panels with both large time 
and cross-section dimensions, and has the advantage of accommodating both the long-run 
equilibrium and the possibly heterogeneous dynamic adjustment process.  
Therefore, a second step in our analysis is to make use of the Common Correlated Effects 
Pooled (CCEP) estimator that accounts for the presence of unobserved common factors by 
including cross-section averages of the dependent and independent variables in the regression 
equation, and where the averages are interacted with country-dummies to allow for country-
specific parameters.5 In the heterogeneous version, the Common Correlated Effects Mean 
Group (CCEMG), the presence of unobserved common factors is achieved by construction 
and the estimates are obtained as averages of the individual estimates (Pesaran, 2006). A 
related and recently developed approach due to Eberhardt and Teal (2010), termed 
Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator, accounts for cross-sectional dependence by 
inclusion of a “common dynamic process”.6 
Finally, the previous set of estimators is complemented with a new fixed-effects 
estimation, with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors, which is a non-parametric 
technique assuming the error structure to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag, 






4 The MG approach consists of estimating separate regressions for each country and computing averages of the 
country-specific coefficients (Evans, 1997; Lee et al., 1997). This allows for heterogeneity of all the parameters. 
5 For reasons of parsimony we abstract from presenting these results but they are available on request. 
6 We thank Markus Eberhardt for making his code available. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
We use annual data for the period 1970-2010.7 Results of first (Im-Pesaran-Shin, 1997; 
Maddala-Wu, 1999) and second generation (Pesaran CIPS, 2007) panel integration tests are 
presented in the Appendix A.8 Essentially we can accept most conservatively that non-
stationarity cannot be ruled out in our dataset.  
Our results for the estimations of (1) and (2), first without the output gap, presented in 
Table 1 show, irrespectively of the estimation method (see also Table 2), statistically 
significant positive coefficient estimates for the lagged first-differenced debt-ratio for the 
fiscal reaction function (1), implying that governments have, on average increased, the 
primary balance as a response to higher previous government indebtedness. Therefore, a 
Ricardian fiscal regime cannot be discarded. On the other hand, the results for the estimation 
of (2) also show that better primary balances have been used to reduce the level of 
outstanding government debt in the subsequent periods.  
[Table 1] 
[Table 2] 
As an additional exercise, accounting for the effects of the business cycle by adding the 
output gap (computed as the difference between actual GDP and potential GDP, the latter 
obtained via HP filter) does not alter our main findings (plus its coefficient comes out 
statistically insignificant). Such results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. In addition, there is 
evidence of counter-cyclical fiscal policies as seen by the positive estimated effect of the 
output gap on the primary balance, while past above trend growth also implies a reduction in 
government indebtedness (see Tables 3-4). 
[Table 3-4] 
In order to provide a further robustness check, we report additional results from the so-
called “forward looking” approach, following the VAR set used by Canzoneri et al. (2001). 
Specifically, we present the impulse-response functions of the (first-differenced) debt-to-GDP 
ratio to innovations in the (first-differenced) primary balance-to-GDP ratio, from an estimated 
VAR in these two variables. The VAR for each country with the first-differenced primary 
balance, debt ratio and the output gap was estimated with one lag and a constant; and the 
optimal lag order was selected using the BIC. The results on a country-by-country basis are 
shown in Figure 1, together with standard errors over a 10-year horizon.  
_____________________________ 
7 The data set is essentially from the AMECO European Commission database, as follows: General government 
gross debt, from Abbas et al. (2010); Primary Balance (% GDP at market prices) code 1.0.319.0.UBLGI for EU 
countries; OECD database for Australia, Canada, Japan, and US. The output gap is also sourced from the OECD. 
8 For further details on these tests, the interested reader should refer to the original sources. 
 6 
[Figure 1] 
As can be seen, a general pattern appears: the debt-to-GDP ratio always exhibits a negative 
response following an innovation in the primary balance ratio (except in the case of Australia, 
but the response is not statistically different from zero), which is increasing for a number of 
years, to become stable later on.9 Therefore, again a fiscal Ricardian behaviour can be 
detected with the authorities using budgetary primary balances in the vein of the fiscal 
function specified in (2), to reduce the outstanding amount of government debt. 
A panel VAR version (P-VAR) was also computed and the impulse response functions are 
depicted in Figure 2a (over a 6-year horizon).10 The same conclusion emerges with respect to 
the response of the (first-differenced) debt ratio to innovations in the (first-differenced) 
primary balance, i.e., a negative response which is always statistically different from zero at 
the entire time horizon. Looking at the responses of (first-differenced) debt ratio to 
innovations in the (first-differenced) output gap we observe a negative impact (statistically 
insignificant until horizon 3). The country-by-country profile is available the Appendix B, 
Figure B.1.  
[Figure 2] 
 
Additionally, from Figure 2b it is possible to confirm the statistically significant reduction 
of the debt ratio as response to increases in the output gap, confirming the results already 
reported for the single regression panel analysis. 
Figure 3 reports the impulse response function of the (first-differenced) primary balance to 
innovations in the (first-differenced) debt ratio. In this case, for five countries a Ricardian 
behaviour is also present, with the primary budget balance improving (increasing) as a 
response to past increase in the debt ratio (statistically significant impulse responses). In the 
context of the P-VAR analysis, and still for the fiscal reaction function (1), the overall 
Ricardian fiscal behaviour is also uncovered as we can see in Figure 2c. We also get a 
positive response of the (first-differenced) primary balance to innovations in the (first-




9 The precision of the estimation of the impulse responses can be gauged by looking at the confidence bands. 
Two standard error bands are the impulse responses are based in Lutkepohl (1990). 
10 We thank Inessa Love for providing the P-VAR code, which we adapted to our own purposes. 
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Regarding the cyclicality of fiscal policy, Figure 2d shows an overall counter-cyclical 
behaviour whereupon the primary balance improves following higher above trend real 
economic growth developments. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have made a reappraisal of fiscal responses in the OECD countries, essentially 
covering notably the relevance of cross-country interactions in the panel analysis, and 
estimating also fiscal responses in the context of a panel VAR. Our main results show that the 
fiscal authorities have increased primary balances to deal with higher government debt levels, 
and that primary budgetary balances increase in order to counteract the level government 
debt.  
Our chief results are robust both for the single regression panel analysis and also for the 
panel VAR estimated impulse reaction functions. Therefore, this evidence is supportive of the 
existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes. In other words, the past track record for the longer 
1970-2010 period indicates that fiscal authorities do seem to care about the sustainability of 
public finances.  
Interestingly, in the country specific VAR, the debt-to-GDP ratio always exhibits a 
negative response following an innovation in the primary balance ratio (except Australia, 
where there is no response). On the other hand, the responses of primary balance ratio to the 
debt ratio are most positive for the countries in the panel, which would, in this case, go along 
with not rejecting some longer term fiscal sustainability view.  
In addition, we also find a counter-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policies as seen by the 
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Table 1: Estimations of Debt Ratios and Primary Balances: 1970-2010 
 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ Debt Dependent Variable: ∆ Primary balance 
Method Pooled OLS Pooled IV-FE Panel IV-FE SYS-GMM Pooled OLS Pooled IV-FE Panel IV-FE SYS-GMM 
∆Debt (-1) 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.00 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.138) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.077) 
∆Primary balance (-1) -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.20 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.14 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.279) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.172) 
         
Obs. 596 567 567 596 625 596 596 625 
R2 0.31 0.31 0.27  0.03 0.03 0.03  
Hansen (p-value)    1.00    1.00 
AR(1)    0.01    0.01 
AR(2)    0.33    0.29 
Note: The models are estimated by either Pooled OLS, Pooled IV-FE, Panel IV-FE or Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged 
regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is ∆ Debt or ∆ Primary Balance. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been 
estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Table 2: Robustness: Estimations of Debt Ratios and Primary Balances: 1970-2010 
 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ Debt Dependent Variable: ∆ Primary balance 
Method Driscoll-Kraay CCEMG MG AMG Driscoll-Kraay CCEMG MG AMG 
∆Debt (-1) 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.34*** 0.16*** 0.06 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 
 (0.084) (0.048) (0.052) (0.042) (0.039) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) 
∆Primary balance (-1) -0.30* -0.22** -0.12 -0.21** 0.15 0.17** -0.05 0.12** 
 (0.143) (0.109) (0.091) (0.090) (0.106) (0.075) (0.056) (0.048) 
         
Obs. 596 596 596 596 625 625 625 625 
Note: The models are estimated by either Fixed Effects Driscoll-Kraay robust S.E., Common Correlated Effects Mean Group, Mean Group, or Augmented Mean 
Group. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Table 3: Estimations of Debt Ratios and Primary Balances, controlling for the Business 
Cycle: 1970-2010 
 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ Debt Dependent Variable: ∆ Primary balance 
Method Pooled OLS Pooled IV-FE Panel IV-FE SYS-GMM Pooled OLS Pooled IV-FE Panel IV-FE SYS-GMM 
∆Debt (-1) 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.49*** 0.63** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.02 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.240) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.152) 
∆Primary balance (-1) -0.19* -0.21* -0.21* -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.118) (0.323) (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.392) 
∆Output Gap (-1) -0.20* -0.17 -0.20* -0.06 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.10 
 (0.114) (0.118) (0.120) (0.433) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.502) 
         
Obs. 562 535 535 562 589 562 562  
R2 0.32 0.33 0.28  0.08 0.07 0.07  
Hansen (p-value)    1.00    1.00 
AR(1)    0.01    0.14 
AR(2)    0.23    0.68 
Note: The models are estimated by either Pooled OLS, Pooled IV-FE, Panel IV-FE or Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged 
regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is ∆ Debt or ∆ Primary Balance.Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been 
estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Table 4: Robustness: Estimations of Debt Ratios and Primary Balances, controlling for 
the Business Cycle: 1970-2010 
 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ Debt Dependent Variable: ∆ Primary balance 
Method Driscoll-Kraay CCEMG MG AMG Driscoll-Kraay CCEMG MG AMG 
∆Debt (-1) 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.17*** 0.09** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (0.088) (0.058) (0.060) (0.043) (0.037) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022) 
∆Primary balance (-1) -0.20 -0.15 -0.04 -0.13* 0.06 0.05 -0.11** -0.18*** 
 (0.153) (0.112) (0.060) (0.070) (0.099) (0.075) (0.058) (0.051) 
∆Output Gap (-1) -0.23 -0.15 -0.29 -0.02 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.18** 0.12** 
 (0.144) (0.173) (0.187) (0.144) (0.061) (0.062) (0.085) (0.055) 
         
Obs. 562 562 562 562 589 589 589 589 
Note: The models are estimated by either Fixed Effects Driscoll-Kraay robust S.E., Common Correlated Effects Mean Group, Mean Group, or Augmented Mean 
Group. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
Note: responses of debt ratios to one S.D. innovation in the primary surplus with two standard error bands. Variables in first differences. 
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Figure 2. Response of debt and primary balance ratios from an estimated P-VAR 
2a 2b 
Response of d.debt/GDP to d.bal/GDP from estimated P-VAR
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Response of d.debt/GDP to d.output gap from estimated P-VAR
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2c 2d 
Response of d.bal/GDP to d.debt/GDP from estimated P-VAR
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Response of d.bal/GDP to d.output gap from estimated P-VAR
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
Note: responses primary surplus of to one S.D. innovation in the debt ratios with two standard error bands. Variables in first differences. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: First Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) Panel Unit Root Test (IPS) (a) 
Full debt  primary balance  Output gap 
in levels      
lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] 
      
1.78 -0.63 0.78 -4.95** 2.39 -18.43*** 
 
Maddala and Wu (1999) Panel Unit Root Test (MW) (b) 
Full debt  primary balance  Output gap  
lags p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) 
in levels       
0 8.06 1.00 26.44 0.87 323.70  0.00  
1 26.27 0.88 54.40 0.03 501.24  0.00  
2 23.20 0.95 45.73 0.13 365.00  0.00  
in first 
differences       
0 98.35 0.00 0.18 0.57 686.75  0.00 
1 54.39 0.02 -0.47 0.32 621.05  0.00 
2 34.08 0.56 0.45 0.67 466.23  0.00 
Notes: (a) We report the average of the country-specific “ideal” lag-augmentation (via AIC). We report the t-bar statistic, constructed as 
 ii tNbart )/1( ( it are country ADF t-statistics). Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic has a non-standard 
distribution: the critical values are -1.73 for 5%, -1.69 for 10% significance level – distribution is approximately t. We indicate the cases where the null is 
rejected with **. (b) We report the MW statistic constructed as  )log(2 ii pp ( ip are country ADF statistic p-values) for different lag-augmentations. 
Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic is distributed )2(2 N . We further report the p-values for each of the MW 
tests.  
 
Table A2: Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test (CIPS) 
Full debt  primary balance  Output gap  
lags p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) 
in levels       
0 4.22 1.00 405.13 0.00 -14.14  0.00  
1 2.29 0.98 208.96 0.00 -14.16  0.00  
2 3.52 1.00 134.98 0.00 -11.52  0.00  
in first differences       
0 -5.63 0.00 -15.97 0.00 -18.75  0.00  
1 -2.53 0.00 -11.07 0.00 -17.44  0.00  
2 0.57 0.71 -7.47 0.00 -14.41  0.00  
` Notes: Null hypothesis of non-stationarity. We further report the p-values for each of the CIPS tests. 
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Appendix B: Country-based VARs controlling for the Business Cycle 






































































































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Note: responses debt ratios of to one S.D. innovation in the output gap with two standard error bands. Variables in first differences. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Note: responses primary surplus of to one S.D. innovation in the output gap with two standard error bands. Variables in first differences. 
